

# Control Server

## HP® Windows® 10 Thin Client HMI System Secure Deployment Guide

Feb 2019



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## ***Related Documents***

<b>Document #</b>	<b>Title</b>
GEH-6840	NetworkST* 3.1/4.0 for Mark VIe Controls Application Guide
GEH-6846	Control Server Installation and Setup Guide
GEH-6857	Control Server HP Windows 10 Thin Client HMI System Maintenance Guide
GEH-6858	Control Server HP Windows 10 Thin Client HMI System User Guide
GHT-200057	How to Remove Unused Software from the Control Server HP Windows 10 Thin Client HMI System
GEH-6721_Vol_I	Mark VIe and VIeS Controls Volume I: System Guide

## ***Acronyms and Abbreviations***

ACL	Access Control List
DHCP	Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
HMI	Human-machine Interface
PDH	Plant Data Highway
RBAC	Role Based Access Control
RPC	Remote Procedure Call
SIEM	Security Information and Event Management
TCP	Transmission Control Protocol
UDH	Unit Data Highway
UDP	User Datagram Protocol
VLAN	Virtual Local Area Network
VM	Virtual Machine

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# 1 *Introduction*

This document provides information to help improve the cyber security of systems that include the Mark\* VIE control system. It is intended for use by control engineers, integrators, IT professionals, and developers responsible for deploying and configuring the Thin Client within the Mark VIE control system.

Each site has its own philosophies, procedures, and audit requirements. In the power generation field many of these will be based on industry standards and practices such as described in ISA-99, IEC-62443, NIST 800, and NERC CIP documents. These standards and practices should be used as guidance while configuring and maintaining the site. This document describes the available tools and concepts that should be followed to help sites meet their security requirements; however, tools alone cannot guarantee a site's compliance. The best password policy enforcement tool cannot protect against posting a password on a sticky-note on a computer monitor - an act that is likely to raise issues during an audit. Site procedures (which are outside the scope of this document) must be created, maintained, and followed to meet most audit requirements.

Certain sections of this document include information about optional products, such as the NetworkST\* 4.0 product with network hardening capability or the SecurityST\* product with its wealth of additional security functions. These products are not required to run the Mark VIE control system, but their pre-packaged functionality can be used to strengthen the site security posture. Whether or not these products are used, the concepts presented in this document should be addressed within each site's specific security requirements.

**The controllers and supervisory-level computers described in this document were not designed for or intended to be connected directly to any wide area network (WAN), including but not limited to a corporate network or the Internet. Additional routers and firewalls (such as those supplied with the NetworkST 4.0 product) that have been configured with access rules customized to the site's specific needs must be used to access devices described in this document from outside the local control networks.**

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# Notes

# 2 Security and Secure Deployment

This chapter introduces the fundamentals of security and secure deployment.

## 2.1 What is Security?

Security is the process of maintaining the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of a system as follows:

**Confidentiality** Ensure only the people you want to see information can see it.

**Integrity** Ensure the data is what it is supposed to be.

**Availability** Ensure the system or data is available for use.

GE recognizes the importance of building and deploying products with these concepts in mind and encourages customers to take appropriate care in securing their GE products and solutions.

Different sites will have different needs and requirements surrounding these concepts. Follow the site's requirements when building, deploying, and using systems, keeping in mind the impact that decisions and procedures will have on the site's security posture.

## 2.2 I have a firewall. Is that enough?

Firewalls and other network security products, including Data Diodes and Intrusion Prevention Devices, can be an important component of any security strategy. However, a strategy based solely on any single security mechanism will not be as resilient as one that includes multiple, independent layers of security. Therefore, GE recommends taking a *Defense in Depth* approach to security.

## 2.3 What is Defense in Depth?

*Defense in Depth* is the concept of using multiple, independent layers of security to raise the cost and complexity of a successful attack. To carry out a successful attack on a system, an attacker would need to find not just a single exploitable vulnerability, but would need to exploit vulnerabilities in each layer of defense that protects an asset. For example, if a system is protected because it is on a network protected by a firewall, the attacker only needs to circumvent the firewall to gain unauthorized access. However, if there is an additional layer of defense, such as a username/password authentication requirement, the attacker would need to find a way to circumvent both the firewall and the username/password authentication.

## 2.4 General Concepts

There are a number of general concepts that are used throughout this document that provide many of the building blocks used to improve a site's security posture. The general concepts are as follows:

**Authentication** is determining or verifying the identity of a user or element requesting access to a resource, or requesting that a particular action be taken.

- Example: The Microsoft® Windows® operating system typically defines a username to establish an identity for a user and a password to verify that the user is who they claim to be.
- Example: Many communications schemes use a certificate to verify the identity of the endpoint(s) of that communication. As part of the initiation of the communication link, one or both sides provide their certificate to verify their identity.

**Authorization** is determining what identities are allowed (authorized) to access a resource or perform an action. Most authorization schemes support multiple levels of authorization, such as a distinction between the ability to view an item versus the ability to modify an item.

- Example: The Microsoft Windows operating system supports multiple levels of access on items (such as ReadOnly versus ReadWrite access to a file) and a set of operating system privileges to control actions that users may take.

**Access Control Lists (ACLs)** are often used as a method of binding together the requester's identity with the level of access allowed. These are defined on a per-item basis, so different items may have different ACLs.

- Example: The Microsoft Windows operating system supports ACLs on files and devices to define which users have what access rights to those items.
- Example: The network switches support ACLs on their administrative interfaces to define which elements of the system have the right to access the administrative functions.

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**Note** When done at the operating system level, ACLs protect an item no matter what tool (program) is used to attempt access - this is called *authoritative security*. This is a stronger level of protection than the tool determining to allow access or not - this is called *cooperative* or *client-based security*. Cooperative security can be bypassed by using a different client to access the resource, authoritative security cannot be bypassed as easily.

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**Least Privileges** is the concept that each user should only be granted the access rights and privileges that they need to perform their work function. This protects items and configurations against inadvertent changes by users, possibly because of malware that the user has inadvertently triggered.

- Example: The Microsoft Windows operating system supports the concept of Administrator level access for making changes to the operating system and software running on the computer. If a user is operating with Administrative access, any malware that they trigger could alter the operating system or any program in any way that it desired. If the user is operating with a non-administrative account they are limited in the changes they can make.
- Example: The ToolboxST\* system supports a Users and Roles concept to define which operations a user is allowed to perform, such as forcing variables, issuing alarm acknowledge, and reset commands, or downloading configurations to controllers.

**Role Based Access Control (RBAC)** is the concept of a consolidation of using the user's identity (authentication) and their allowed rights (authorization) in a manor slightly easier to maintain. An intermediate concept of a user's Role is introduced, which defines a collection of users with shared access rights and privileges. This simplifying scheme has a number of benefits, such as:

- Authorization (done on a per-item basis) is given not to a set of user identities, but instead to a Role - it's ACL is not a list of usernames but a (much smaller) list of Roles. As users are added and removed from the system, the ACLs on each item do not have to change since they were tied to the Roles and not the users, making updates faster and more efficient.
- Reporting on the members of a single Role is quick and easy compared to having to visit all items and examine their individual ACLs.
- If a user's Role changes (their job requirements change), it is a simpler task to assign them to a new role, or to revert it back if the change was only temporary.



- New roles are typically easy to define as the site's operating procedures change and different classifications of users are required or different sets of privileges are identified.
- Example: The Microsoft Windows operating system has a single security group that grants Administrative access to computers - the Administrators group. Adding or removing a user to the Administrators group will grant or revoke the user's administrative privileges and the individual ACLs on all files and devices does not have to be changed.
- Example: The ToolboxST system supports a Users and Roles concept, which defines the rights and privileges granted for each Role. If a site decides to change whether the operator's role is allowed to force variables, granting or revoking the Force privilege to the operators role is all that is required - there is no need to change each user's privileges.

## 2.5 What is Hardening?

*Hardening* a system includes taking steps to reduce attack surfaces that may be used in an attack on a system. These steps include removing functions that are not essential and changing system settings to help deter attacks. Each section in this document provides information on how to help harden each component, but the following concepts apply to most products:

- Disable unused servers and services on each device.
- Create and maintain the list of users and their rights. Disable or remove a user's account as soon as the person is no longer granted access rights to the equipment.
- Implement the site's password policies, where possible by configuring the equipment to reject passwords that do not meet the standards automatically.
- Remove all as-shipped accounts or, if the account is to remain, change all passwords as soon as feasible during the site commissioning process. Implement strict site policy and controls to limit the exposure of passwords.

## 2.6 General Recommendations

The following general recommendations should be used to improve the security posture at the site:

- Provide physical security for all devices - many, if not most devices can be compromised by an attacker that has physical access to the device at startup/boot time or direct access to the non-volatile media that the device boots from (such as hard drive or flash memory). Access to network equipment (switches, routers) can allow for introduction of new devices onto the networks, including network monitoring equipment.
- Disable unused services on devices to reduce the mechanisms available for attacks.
- Wherever possible, configure the site's password requirements (length, complexity) into the devices or operating systems to have each device enforce them automatically. If it cannot be automatically enforced it must be performed by procedure.
- Implement RBAC wherever possible and keep the list of users and roles current. Some system components allow for logging (auditing) failures. Use these if available, preferably logging to a centralized site Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) (if available) for both convenience and pattern analysis across devices.
- Implement a site-wide scheme for applying software patches, especially those defined as security patches.

Limiting visibility to the control system is a strong defense-in-depth approach to help prevent attacks. This is accomplished by using separate communications networks (Virtual Local Area Networks [VLANs]) to isolate different equipment types, then tightly controlling the network traffic that can cross from one VLAN to another. There are various schemes and recommendations (ISA-99, IEC-62443) that include network segmentation and should be followed when making any networking changes or while introducing new equipment to the control system.

- Consider using a dedicated point-to-point link instead of a shared network for dedicated functions within the same network zone. Never bridge network zones using a dedicated link, always go through a router that provides controlled access (and optional logging).
- Consider using an additional firewall even within a network zone to add additional constraints on traffic, especially if the traffic includes a protocol that does not support authentication.

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# Notes

# 3 Thin Client Security Guidelines

This chapter provides security guidelines for the secure deployment of HP® Windows 10 Thin Client terminals.

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**Note** Windows Thin Clients must undergo a hardening procedure that includes joining them to the network domain, application of Thin Client group policy, and removal of unused software. Refer to the section [Configuration Hardening](#) for more information.

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## 3.1 Security Capabilities

### 3.1.1 User Authentication and Authorization

Under normal operation, users are automatically logged in to the Thin Client terminal local User account. The automatic logon sequence does not require the user to enter a password. The local User account provides user mode access to the Thin Client terminal. User mode provides access to pre-configured Remote Desktop (RDP) connections that provide the interface to the Virtual Machines (VMs) running on the Control Server, while restricting the user's ability to view or change the Thin Client terminal's configuration.

Administrative mode is required to make changes to the Thin Client terminal and to view configuration and debugging information. Full administrative access is provided through the local Administrator account. Domain Administrators have privileges to make configuration changes; however, some functions such as enabling or disabling the Write Filter require the use of the local Administrator account.

Adhere to the following guidelines:

- Maintain local account passwords according to site policy. Complexity and reuse of rules is not enforced by the equipment and must be addressed by procedure.
- Users should be provided with local account passwords according to their roles and responsibilities. Administrative level accounts to the Thin Client terminal should only be provided to those who require them to perform their job function.
- Make sure to change all local account factory default passwords as soon as possible during the site commissioning process.

### 3.1.2 Access Control Mechanisms

Thin Client terminal local accounts are granted different levels of access to the Thin Client terminal. The assigned privilege levels control the level of access to Thin Client terminal subsystems, including the ability to view and modify the Thin Client terminal configuration. User Account access privileges are as follows:

- Local User accounts provide normal user level access to the Thin Client terminal. This account is used unless the automatic logon sequence is overridden by the user.
- Local Administrator accounts provide administrative access to the Thin Client terminal. This account can be used to modify the Thin Client terminal configuration. Use of this account password should be limited to those with the requirement to re-configure or troubleshoot the Thin Client terminal.

### 3.1.3 Write Filter

Thin Client terminals employ a Write Filter that is active during normal operation. The Write Filter directs all file system writes to a temporary cache. All changes are discarded when the Thin Client terminal is rebooted, restoring the terminal to its original state. Only users with Administrative privileges can disable the Write Filter and make persistent changes to the Thin Client terminal. The Write Filter should only be disabled long enough to make necessary changes and then immediately enabled. For more information, refer to the *Control Server HP Windows 10 Thin Client HMI System Maintenance Guide* (GEH-6857), the section *Write Filter*.

## 3.2 Communication Requirements

### 3.2.1 Network Connectivity

Thin Client terminals have a single Ethernet connection to the Plant Data Highway (PDH) network. The PDH is used to establish a connection and open a session on a host computer. Adhere to the following guidelines:

- Thin Client terminals should never be connected to the UDH.
- Thin Client terminals should never bridge multiple networks - only one network should ever be connected.
- If there are multiple Thin Client terminals located together (such as in a central control room), each Thin Client terminal should be connected to a different network switch - typically one would be connected to each switch in a redundant switch pair.
- Consider pulling two Ethernet cables (one from each switch in a redundant pair) to the location of the Thin Client terminal. In case of network or switch failure, the cable on the Thin Client terminal could quickly be replaced (the existing connection unplugged and the other connection plugged in) to re-establish PDH connectivity. After the network issue is addressed, the connection should be reverted so that the Thin Client terminals are once again connected to different switches.

Thin Client terminals are designed to be used to establish connections within the local control zone (specifically to hosts on the PDH). Adhere to the following guidelines:

- Do not configure the Thin Client terminals with a default gateway address or router address that would allow communications outside of the local network.
- If external routing is a site requirement, the use of routers and/or firewalls with appropriate rules to limit the addresses and protocols allowed to pass should be implemented.

Thin Client terminals are typically configured to use the DHCP to reserve an IP address. Since loss of DHCP servers can prevent the Thin Client terminal from obtaining an IP address, or renewing it when the lease has expired, the lease times configured into the DHCP servers is purposefully longer than typical industry standards. The long lease should not cause problems because the number of Thin Client terminals is typically an order of magnitude less than the pool of IP addresses, and Thin Client terminals do not tend to come and go from the site to drain the address pool.

- If the site has many Thin Client terminals joining and leaving the network (an unlikely event), a reduction in the DHCP lease period may be necessary. An option may be to script or manually clean out unused but not-yet-expired device leases if the IP address pool starts to grow low. This would be an unusual condition.
- If changes are made to the DHCP lease time, it may be worthwhile to consider its relationship to the Windows Cached Credential expiration period (currently 31 days in Microsoft Windows operating systems).
- Static addresses that do not conflict with other site equipment should be available in case manual assignment of Thin Client terminal IP addresses is required during a long-term failure of the DHCP servers. These addresses should be outside of the DHCP address pool space in order to prevent conflicts when the DHCP servers are put back into service.

### 3.2.2 Ports and Services List

Port	Protocol	Service	Description
135	TCP	msrpc	Windows Remote Procedure Call (RPC)
5985	TCP	wsman	Windows PowerShell remote session port

## 3.3 Configuration Hardening

Windows Thin Clients must undergo a hardening procedure that includes joining them to the network domain, application of Thin Client group policy, and removal of unused software. Thin Clients must be hardened before they can be applied to and used in the Control Server system. Refer to the *Control Server HP Windows 10 Thin Client HMI System Maintenance Guide* (GEH-6857) for further details.

### 3.3.1 Domain Membership

The Control Server system design requires the Windows Thin clients to join the network domain for operational and security reasons. Joining the domain applies Thin Client Group Policy settings that are critical to Thin Client security.

### 3.3.2 Unused Software Removal

The Windows Thin Clients come from the manufacturer with software that is not used in the Control Server system. Unused software must be removed from the Thin Client to reduce the attack surface presented by the Thin Client. Refer to *How to Remove Unused Software from the Control Server HP Windows 10 Thin Client HMI System* (GHT-200057) for further details.

### 3.3.3 USB Port

Most Thin Client terminals provide USB ports for both local usage (re-flash the local BIOS if needed - the *unbrick* procedure) and for sharing the USB drive with a host to make it available within the current host session. Adhere to the following guidelines:

- Verify the source and integrity of media before placing it into site equipment.
  - Software distributions should be verified by whichever method the manufacturer supports, such as signed installation files or a separate website that lists the hashes for the files on the distribution media.
  - Use of password protected media does not ensure that the media is free from malicious software, but it does help prevent the media from being infected while left unattended.
- Consider using hardware USB port locks to prevent access to USB ports, and/or pull the front or rear USB port connectors from the motherboard.
- Consider blocking the use of USB ports on all but one or two Thin Client terminals (often the ones associated with Engineering Workstations) to limit USB exposure, then use the internal network to transfer the information to computers that need it.
- Make sure the AutoRun option in the host operating system is disabled to help prevent software from being automatically run when the media is inserted or the session connection is established.
- Set secure passwords for each local User account in each Thin Client terminal and limit exposure to only those who require them as described in the section [User Authentication and Authorization](#).

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# Notes

# Glossary of Terms

**DHCP** A protocol that allows a device to request (lease) an IP address on the network from a DHCP server. The device will have exclusive use of that IP address until it releases the address or the lease time expires.

**Domain Controller** A server that provides identity management functions. It holds a database of the users defined and the groups that those users are members of that are used to control user access to various resources.

**Firewall** A device that connects between multiple networks in order to limit the types of traffic that are allowed to flow between the networks.

**Management Data Highway (MDH)** A network containing devices that need to be monitored but not controlled. Traffic from the Monitoring Zone (MDH) to the Control Zone (PDH and UDH) must go through a router with access lists that limits the traffic allowed.

**PDH** A network used to transport non-critical information within the Control Zone. Traffic to the Control Zone (PDH and UDH) from outside the Control Zone must go through a router with access lists that limits the traffic allowed.

**SIEM** A server that collects event messages from various other subsystems to provide a central location for analyzing and viewing these events.

**Router (Network)** A networking device that is typically connected to multiple different networks with rules that define what message traffic is allowed to cross from one network to a different network.

**Switch (Network)** A networking device that connects multiple devices together to form an Ethernet Network.

**UDH** A network that is used to transport critical control information within the Control Zone. Traffic to the Control Zone (PDH and UDH) from outside the Control Zone must go through a router with access lists that limit the allowed traffic.

**VLAN** A mechanism for logically connecting multiple devices into one network within a switch or router. Networking equipment typically support multiple different VLANs within a single switch to provide isolation of network segments within a single switch. VLANs include the UDH, PDH, MDH, MGH, and DMZ.

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## **Notes**







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